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Abstract—The protection of internetworked systems by
cryptographic techniques have crystallized as a funda-
mental aspect in establishing secure systems. Comple-
mentary, detection mechanisms for instance based on
Intrusion Detection Systems has established itself as a
fundamental part in holistic security eco-systems in the
previous years. However, the interpretation of and reac-
tion on detected incidents is still a challenging task. In this
paper an incident handling environment with relevant
components and exemplary functionality is proposed that
involves the processes from the detection of incidents over
their analysis to the execution of appropriate reactions.
An evaluation of a selection of implemented interacting
components using technology such as OpenFlow or Snort
generally proofs the concept.
I. INTRODUCTION
New and progressive technologies and their fast
development in recent years, led to a broad spectrum of
security holes considering the increasing possibilities
that are also available to attackers [1]. Incidents, such
as cyber attacks, become not only more numerous and
diverse but also more damaging and disruptive [2].
Apart from the prevention, the detection by Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), either signature-based or
anomaly-based, have made their way into the security
area and allow the detection of malicious actions when
cryptographic mechanisms are outwitted or broken [3].
According to [1], a concept including cryptographic
procedures as well as IDS components is mandatory
for a comprehensive security solution. Systems that
combine the goods from both worlds are presented
in [4]. Adding alarm functionality to cryptograhpic
mechanisms, when for instance sequence/packet coun-
ters drift apart, the decryption process fails due to
tampering or message authentication code checks are
violated, can be used to identify malicious behavior
in networks. The detection process has only value if
there is an appropriate response. New terms, such as
Huge Data, state the trend of an ever increasing amount
of data, leading to challenges in reliably identifying
attacks due to many raised alarms. The alert analysis
and planning as well as executing appropriate reactions
can no longer be clamped by humans. Also under the
circumstances that manual operation cannot guarantee
the response time and accuracy, an efficient auto-
matic decision-making support method is desperately
needed [5]. New approaches for instance applying
machine learning techniques help to handle the detec-
tion of massive input data. A semi-automated incident
management is crucial to complement prevention and
detection methods to a holistic security eco-system.
The focus of this paper lies in the identification of
required components and possible applications as well
as interactions between them to cope with various
detected incidents.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
Section II gives details on incident handling and related
work. The proposed concept with relevant components
for a comprehensive incident handling environment
and exemplary applications are described in section III.
Section IV deals with the evaluation of selected parts
of the concept. A short conclusion and a glance at the
future work of the ongoing research work is finalizing
the paper in section V.
II. INCIDENT HANDLING
Incident handling is a process involving various
disciplines in order to remedy violations to certain
security policies. Many past incident handling and re-
sponse planning methods, such as [6], targeted a higher
level of abstraction in which mainly plans for human
instructions in an incident response team are derived to
cope with occurring incidents. An automated approach
for responding to incidents has not been focused. How-
ever, managing the sheer number of raised alerts over-
whelms many instructors such that the ideal considered
reaction in realtime to zero-day exploits becomes an
unreachable target. Self-learning systems that leverage,
e.g. artificial intelligence, seems a promising approach
for an automated incident response management. The
work in [7] presents a system based on the usage
of artificial intelligence in forensics, which collects
and stores the data from a crime scene, and examines
any correlation with previously solved crimes. The
approach is directed to the forensic use case. This
impedes the application of the adaption to a realtime
response planning within an environment of various
techniques of network attack detection. However, the
involvement of previous successfully detected network
attacks and expert knowledge from security specialists
in conjunction with machine learning techniques seems
quite promising to an incident handling architecture.
The survey in [2] proposes a Security Operations
Center (SOC) including their mission and main func-
tions that serves as an incident management system
necessary to detect information security incidents, mit-
igating possible vulnerabilities exploited and restoring
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compromised Internet of Things infrastructures. The
system might be able to automatically research, gather,
ultimately identify incidents, evaluate, categorize and
analyze them. However, the work only implemented a
subset of parts of the comprehensive survey.
In [8] an intrusion prevention system for cloud envi-
ronments based on Snort and OpenFlow is presented in
which Snort is acting as an IPS. A Snort Agent filters
network traffic on SDN-switches and forwards alerts
to a server. On the server, the alarms are correlated
and new filter rules are generated. The rules will be
distributed to the SDN-Switches via an OpenFlow
controller. The rule generation is roughly described and
need more effort in research. There is no correlation
of related incidents, which occur on different points of
time, because no historical data is used. The system
further is only working autonomously so that the
plausibility of each new rule must be questioned.
There are a lot more incident management systems,
but they mainly operate on their own without the inter-
action of other components. This limits their usability
and reliability in more complex systems for incident
and response management. For example, a combination
of the three presented concepts would provide a strong
improvement in attack detection. [7] could generate
a correlation model for [8] which is able to perform
reactions in realtime. A SOC could be used to bring
detected incidents in a human readable form and expert
knowledge can then bring updates into the correlation
model. Another aspect of the systems is that they are
not designed to work partially autonomous. Therefore
a novel concept for incident management is proposed
addressing not only those topics but also allowing the
application of various detection mechanisms in order
to exploit each method’s strengths.
III. PROPOSED CONCEPT
In the context of this paper the proposed con-
cept for a partially autonomous incident management
comprises several disciplines shown in figure 1. The
Detection module provides information about detected
incidents from various input data source to the Analysis
module. Multiple mechanisms can be involved but
each does not necessarily provide information about
an actual attack or system failure. This component
is continuously updated with new incident patterns
identified by the Post-Processing module. The Analysis
component is the main intelligence of the incident han-
dling environment. Different advanced methods such
as data mining, clustering, and correlation can achieve
the detection of already known or novel attacks as well
as system failures based on the provided information
from the Detection module. The Analysis component
contains historical data (database accessibility) with
previous detected attacks and their respective response
measures. Similar to the previous component, input
from the Post-Processing component continuously up-
dates the database. If the Analysis module identifies
already known patterns, the Response component is
instructed to automatically execute a reaction. An
expert is informed about performed responses from
this module. The Post-Processing module receives the
analyzed data (e.g. patterns) from the Analysis module
and refines it for the experts in form of visualization
or logging. It receives the instructions or confirmations
about proposed reactions from the Expert Knowledge,
updates the database and if required performs adjust-
ments of detection mechanisms. Human experts or
security analysts operate within the Expert Knowledge
module for instance in a SOC to cross-evaluate post-
processing measures or monitor automated reactions.
Orchestrating each module is a challenging task. Thus,
a flexible Communication Framework is needed en-
abling the frictionless exchange of information.
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Fig. 1. Incident handling environment
A. Detection
The detection of incidents can be performed by
either using an IDS or exploiting the nature of crypto-
graphic mechanisms as described in the following. The
focus of this paper lies in the detection of incidents
based on network traffic but the concept also allows
input from different sources such as the firmware in
use or the output of vulnerability assessments.
Intrusion Detection: IDSs can be used to detect ma-
licious activities or policy violations by monitoring the
network traffics or system activities and can be catego-
rized in three common architectures: Host-based IDS
(HIDS), Application-based IDS (AIDS) and Network-
based IDS (NIDS). Input data for incident handling
from HIDS could be detected anomalies for instance
in parsed log-files. In the past years, the main attention
focused on the application of NIDS [9] which can be
placed either centralized, decentralized or distributed
within networks on either network switching entities
(router, gateway, etc.) or dedicated hosts. There are
two mainstream methods for IDS to detect intrusions:
misuse-based and anomaly-based. The former, also
called signature- or knowledge-based, is founded on
a set of rules or patterns describing network attacks
which are either pre-configured by the system or manu-
ally by an administrator. The other method collects data
containing examples of normal behavior and builds a
model of familiarity, therefore, any action that deviates
from the model is considered suspicious and is clas-
sified as an anomaly. The main advantage compared
to misuse-based systems is that they are able to detect
zero-day intrusions [10]. However, anomaly-based IDS
suffer from false-negative and false-positive alarms. To
overcome the drawbacks and exploit the advantages of
both methods, hybrid systems are proposed such the
one presented in [11].
Cryptographic Mechanisms: Another possibility of
incident detection is to exploit violations of the na-
ture of cryptographic mechanisms, such as MACsec,
IPsec or TLS, for alert generation that define a se-
curity infrastructure to provide data confidentiality,
data integrity and data origin authentication. MACsec,
as an example, relies on GCM-AES to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of all the network traf-
fic mitigating attacks on layer-2 protocols [12]. In a
MACsec-protected network further unauthorized LAN
connections can be identified and excluded from the
network communication over IEEE 802.1X port based
authentication. Thus, mismatching packet numbers,
failing decryption or the detection of unauthorized
LAN connections could lead to an alarm generation.
For Message Authentication Codes, alarm generation
could be applied for mismatching hash digests. A com-
bination of cryptographic prevention using continuous
authentication for the detection is proposed in [13].
The concept in this work is designed for modularity
to utilize various detection mechanisms in a hybrid
approach exploiting each strengths to avail the merits
and alleviate their demerits. However, the utilization
strongly depends on the environment, application field
and task such that it might not be feasible to use
multiple mechanisms. For evaluation, the focus for
a first proof of concept relies on only applying one
signature-based IDS providing detected incidents to the
Analysis component.
B. Analysis
Many work, for instance [5], make assumptions for
response planning that each alert raised by a detection
engine is treated as one attack. The aggregation and
fusion of alarms should be taken into account by the
detection system but they assume 100% confidence of
the alerts. Sanity checks of the detection engine ensur-
ing a better certainty is often out of scope. However,
a detection system might raise false alerts.
Especially in environments in which multiple detec-
tion mechanisms operate, an intelligent alert analysis
is vital to handle the massive amount of alarms from
various sources and to intelligently react to incidents.
In [14] for instance a comparison of supervised, semi-
supervised and unsupervised learning methods for
anomaly-based NIDS have been examined each having
it’s particular strengths but their detection capability
differ significantly. According to [15], IDSs are not
enough to detect complex attacks over a network. For
detecting attacks with high accuracy, the input of each
mechanism might be important but operating for in-
stance in safety-critical environments, cross-evaluation
or plausibility checks of various inputs is essential
before performing a reaction. A standardized format,
such as the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF) [16], is needed to bridge the outputs
of various detection mechanisms and to perform an
alert analysis on which basis appropriate reactions can
be initiated. Fitting the alert output of cryptographic
schemes or anomaly-based algorithms into IDMEF
provides interoperability with already IDMEF-capable
IDSs such as Snort/Barnyard2, OSSEC, Surricata or
Prelude.
Generally three different analysis methods exist:
similarity-based, sequential-based and case-based. For
similarity-based methods, the correlation is based on
feature similarity, such as IP addresses and ports
associated with their occurrence. These methods are
relatively easy to implement. The correlation can be
improved as more specific features are detected. But
no complex correlations can be identified. Sequential-
based correlation uses relationships between multiple
causal events. Therefore, pre- and postconditions have
to be considered. Preconditions can be a set of require-
ments needed to trigger an alarm. Postconditions are
the consequences of the execution of an event. Case-
based correlation is defined for resolving new incidents
based on similar incidents. The quality depends on the
algorithms responsible for recognizing specific patterns
of behavior. Often a combination of the analysis meth-
ods is used.
The framework described in [17] uses offline and
online correlation. The former is used to generate a
correlation model from historical alarms. It is regularly
updated with new data from online correlation which
generates meta-alerts based on real-time alerts. The
meta-alerts are compared, then prioritized and clus-
tered. Next, pattern mining extracts features for each
cluster and generates an attack pattern graph. Finally,
a Graph Frequency Pattern Mining Algorithm extracts
common patterns from each cluster. The framework
is optimized for a graphic information exchange to
administrators, which makes it difficult to use in a
partially autonomous system.
Different aspects of the analysis have to be com-
bined for semi-automatic systems. Thus, historical data
can be used to quickly evaluate known attack patterns
and instruct the Response module. The correlation
model must be constantly customized to recognize new
patterns and should use a combination of the three
analysis methods. For this, an interaction with the
Post-Processing unit is important. By using IDMEF,
different detection systems can be used simultaneously
as information source.
C. Response
Response or reaction implies the set of actions the
system executes after incidents have been detected.
Such a reaction could include reconfiguring the net-
work through Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
techniques, generating new configurations for firewalls,
creating new misuse-based IDS rules or adapting the
parameters for incident detection mechanisms.
An example for the latter is to adjust the sampling
rate for IDSs. Such systems are applied either in
environments characterized by having a large amount
of network traffic or to save system resources (memory,
CPU consumption). An adaptive sampling mechanism
is presented in [18]. As a reaction to identified in-
cidents by detection mechanisms, the sampling rate
could be increased to analyze a greater amount of
traffic in-depth if the amount of data for analysis is
unsatisfactory to make a precise decision.
A further automatic response later evaluated in the
paper is to automatically generate rules for an IDS.
Previous work in this field faced issues regarding
automation, robustness and elaboration in real net-
work environments. Addressing those challenges, as
an example, the work in [19] proposes an automatic
signature generation method called SigBox for fine-
grained traffic generation using modified sequence
pattern algorithm targeting content, packet, and flow
signatures for Snort.
Exploiting SDN technology to reconfigure the net-
working environment is a further reaction possibil-
ity. Controlling network flows dynamically enables
to separate malicious (or suspicious) network flows
from benign ones dynamically. For example, supposed
that a NIDS detects some suspected flows, the flows
can be rerouted for in-depth investigation, e.g., in a
honeypot [20]. Further firewall functionality can be
implemented using SDN. When a switch receives a
new packet and there is no rule matching this packet in
the flow table, it reports it to the SDN-controller which
forwards, the packet to the firewall application. The
firewall checks whether the incoming packet violates
security policies or not and enforces a new flow rule
accordingly. This rule is delivered to the switch by
the controller and all future packets from the flow
of the first packet would be handled directly in the
switch without the need to interact with the con-
troller again [21]. Another possibility applying SDN
to respond to a specific incident is through network
separation. In traditional networks, the common way to
separate a network is employing Virtual LAN (VLAN)
technique, which adds specific IDs in a packet header
(12-bits VLAN ID field). However, VLAN technology
incurs scalability limits in large-scale networks, since it
can only assign 4,096 different virtual networks. SDN-
based separation solutions provide the capability of
different level abstractions with desired security prop-
erties, which not only separates the network segments
efficiently at scale, but also veils the physical view of
networks to users [22].
Above mentioned response measures are examples
that can be executed autonomously within the concept
if instructed by the Analysis component if a historic
similar incident already occurred in the past. If an
automatic reaction is not possible, further examination
is necessary in the Post-Processing module which also
allows expert interaction.
D. Post-Processing
Post-Processing features can have a broad spectrum
ranging from visualizing analyzed incidents to working
them up, logging each interaction, as well as per-
forming cross-evaluation of already executed reactions.
Visual analysis or presentation can help in intrusion
detection and to prepare a flood of complex data for
the end user accordingly. Efficient incident information
visualization is an important element, which is not
only vital for unknown attack detection. Appropriate
presentation methods for different groups of implicated
persons are necessary to display incidents helping to
recognize and respond to attacks quickly. It also allows
an interaction, such as the confirmation of reaction
execution through expert knowledge by a human espe-
cially necessary in highly critical environments. Apart
from this, a cross-evaluation could help to mitigate
false-negatives and reinforce IDS functionality through
the involvement of various data sources available from
the system or an administrator. An administrator or
developer needs a deeper and detailed insight, for
instance to clarify incidents from a forensic point of
view. In such case, the Honeypot example mentioned
above in the context of SDN can be an appropri-
ate method to deliver in-depth investigated statements
about the incidents. A novel real-time visualization,
also considering a cross-evaluation by humans, is
proposed in [23] to effectively display many security
events collected by multiple IDS.
The lore gained from the Post-Processing compo-
nent including Expert Knowledge continuously im-
proves the quality of the incident handling environment
by adjusting the Detection or updating the Analysis
module which has then an immediate influence on the
Response component.
E. Communication Framework
A crucial part in order to orchestrate the incident
handling components and enabling an exchange of
information is the communication. This is especially
the case if the components are not implemented on the
same physical system. Thus, a framework that satisfies
the following requirements is needed.
• Guaranteeing the authenticity of each component
• Logging of each interaction for traceability and
forensics
• Guaranteeing the authenticity, confidentiality, in-
tegrity and privacy of exchanged information
• Enforcing policy-based access restrictions
A proposed system for the concept that can be
utilized as a communication backbone satisfying the
requirements above, is the Distributed Smart Space
Orchestration System (DS2OS) [24]. DS2OS divides
the framework in two layers: Middleware and Ser-
vices. The middleware provides a uniform, scenario-
independent interface for participating components. It
is utilized by a distributed system whose components
may run on distributed nodes that have a sufficient
amount of free resources and allows storing and bro-
kering state context between multiple computation
devices (e.g computers, embedded controllers).
Dedicated functions of the components described
above within the incident handling environment can
be implemented as dedicated services. The explicit
separation from the middleware as a used communi-
cation platform makes it possible to create services
dynamically for the different use cases. In addition, ser-
vices can be dynamically started, stopped or migrated
between the distributed middleware components, de-
pending on the available resources, for example. Pos-
sible services for the incident handling eco-system are
data aggregation, feature extraction, intrusion detec-
tion, alert analysis, logging, or reaction execution.
IV. EVALUATION
The proposed automated incident handling environ-
ment ranging from detection, analysis, reaction to post-
processing measures is evaluated within a virtualized
Proxmox environment as depicted in figure 2. Parts
of the incident handling environment of figure 1 are
implemented in the Incident Management component
using open source tools as well as the in Python lan-
guage written Incident Processing Application (IPA).
Communication takes place in form of local services
via DS2OS. In a simple scenario, a proof of concept
is established.
Host 1 is communicating with Host 2 over the
network route including the Open vSwitches OVS 0
and OVS 1. The route from OVS 0 to Host 2 over OVS 2
is not configured by default. An Attacker tries to send
malicious messages to Host 1 and Host 2. Intrusion
detection is performed on the Incident Management
entity using the open source NIDS Snort based on the
mirrored traffic from OVS 0. Further the entity contains
the Python rules based correlation engine Prelude-
Correlator from the Prelude-SIEM used for a simple
alert analysis. Thus, it receives the IDMEF-based alerts
from the IDS and raises an alert in the case of a
successful correlation based on a provided ruleset.
As an automated response, based on a correlation
alert stored in a database representing a reaction based
on a historical incident, the Incident Management
entity creates a new Snort rule and reloads it (IV-A).
A second evaluation includes the interaction between
post-processing and admin confirmation (IV-B) to re-
configure the Open vSwitches OVS 1 and OVS 2 based
on the OpenFlow controller OpenMUL.
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Fig. 2. Evaluation environment for incident detection and reaction
A. IDS Reconfiguration
Snort analyzes the mirrored traffic from the network
using Winpcap, analyzes for matches to a defined rule
set and generates alerts in the unified2 binary output
format. Allowing Snort to write these output files will
not cause Snort missing network packets. The open
source interpreter Barnyard2 is then used to parse the
binary data into IDMEF in a separate task. Using
Prelude, the generated IDMEF alerts are provided to a
central management unit called the Prelude Manager.
In the scenario two rules are existing. One, exemplary
shown below, that creates an alarm of any IP address,
except Host 1’s, is sending any message to Host 2 and
one vice versa.
alert any !$IP HOST 1 any -> $IP HOST 2 any
(msg:”Unknown host communicating to Host 2”;
sid:10000000; rev:1;)
IPA contains functionality from the Prelude-
Correlator which is used to trigger a simple correlation
alert if both of the above rules match for the IP address
of the Attacker entity. Further the application creates
and activates a new Snort rule, as a response measure,
that explicitly triggers for any communication sent
by the attacker. Based on the results of an already
executed reaction in the past, stored in a SQL database
showing the same behavior, a new rule mask is pro-
vided for response. Thus, first a new Snort ID must be
determined, the new rule (shown below) and the new
sid-entry for the sid-msg.map file created, loaded to
the Snort system and added to the appropriate files.
alert any $IP ATTACKER any -> any any
(msg:”Unknown host (attacker) communicating”;
sid:10000002; rev:1;)
In order to activate the new rule without missing
any packets, Snort needs be reloaded using a SIGHUP
signal. Snort utilized in inline mode connecting the
attacker to the network would even allow to block all
further activities if Snorts rule header is configured to
drop the packets when the rule matches.
B. Network Reconfiguration
In a second scenario, IPA is used to reconfigure the
network based on SDN technology. Thus again the first
Snort rule from above is used to detect malicious hosts
communicating to Host 2. If the Attacker is sending
malicious packets to Host 2 via the route consisting of
OVS 0 and OVS 1 an alarm is raised. Since no historical
event is known in the database, the post-processing is
presenting an admin the event in the graphical front-
end Prewikka of the Prelude-SIEM and waiting for
a possible reaction by the admin. Then, the Incident
Management entity is reconfiguring OVS 1 and OVS 2
such that network traffic is further only forwarded by
OVS 2 for in-depth investigation within a honeypot.
Thus, IPA is determining the dpid of the two Open
vSwitches created by the OpenFlow controller in order
to create new OpenFlow rules. It further temporarily
saves the existing rules and determines whether a new
OpenFlow rule must be created for the attacker’s IP
address. If the new rules are added, the controller
distributes them triggered by a command line inter-
face command of IPA. While in the reconfiguration
process, malicious traffic might still flow for a certain
duration. In a measurement, the duration from the
detection by Snort until the final reconfiguration of the
Open vSwitches could be determined to an average of
733.76 ms for 74 measurements. Further work aims to
reduce this time.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The necessity for protecting computer networks by
the detection of incidents and partially autonomous
reaction demands a comprehensive incident handling
environment. The proposed concept in this paper
identifies several required components ranging from
various detection mechanisms to reaction possibilities
and provides exemplary functionality. The evaluation
provides a first proof of concept that includes an auto-
matic reaction to detected incidents based on historical
information and in a second scenario the involvement
of expert confirmation including a reaction over a post-
processing measure.
The detection of incidents in the evaluation was
based on the single IDS Snort. Exploiting the ad-
vantages of the proposed concept to include various
detection mechanisms for instance by anomaly-based
machine learning methods have already been imple-
mented and evaluated during the writing of this paper.
Further research needs to be done to extend them with
IDMEF and to integrate them into the incident handling
environment. In addition, the concept is not limited to a
central incident detection and reaction component. The
next step of evaluation is also to include distributed
components enabled by the strengths of the DS2OS
framework to address distributed anomaly detection
approaches.
Instead of relying on simple analysis techniques
such as with Prelude-Correlator more sophisticated
approaches as proposed in [25] are aimed to be in-
tegrated in the near future. Multiple techniques ap-
plied alongside in a hybrid fashion could improve the
incident analysis capabilities. Targeting the require-
ment for traceability and forensics of actions within
the incident handling a promising approach could be
based on the usage of Distributed Ledger Technology
for instance implemented with Blockchains. Further
research aims to exploit such technology to either
log each interaction tamper-resistant implemented in
the DS2OS communication framework or to exploit
their consensus algorithm for conformity of various
detection mechanism output.
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